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The Culture in-between: Anthropologist and 
Missionary as Partners 
Waiter van Beek 
In his challenging identification of missionary and anthropologist, 
Sjaak van der Geest (1987) touches upon several fundamental 
issues in the anthropological discipline. For some reason the 
similarities (and differences) of both types of field workers are at the 
core of our anthropological definition of the self. Commenting on 
the similarities, I shall try to unravel some factors behind them, as 
there seems to be a fundamental contradiction between the two 
disciplines: opposite goals with similar outputs. One major dif-
ference, as Van der Geest sees it, has to be dealt with first, i.e. how 
'seriously' we take religion, or in my terms, the question of emics. I 
try to show that this quest for emics is theoretically a dead end, as it 
is both epistemologically impossible and unproductive through the 
demand for comparison. This leads us to the question what are the 
limits of our empathy and sympathy of belief. 
Returning, then, to our main theme, the roots of similarities 
and differences between anthropologist and missionary, it will be 
shown that the field situation of both has the following things in 
common: empathy, sympathy of belief, a gentle comparison and a 
definite search for emics. This is what I call the 'in-between' or 
'intermediate' culture, shared by anthropologist and missionary 
alike. 
The problem of emics 
Do anthropologists take religion seriously? One complaint of Van 
der Geest (1987) is that anthropologists refuse to take informants 
statements on religion at their own value, routinely translating 
them into the scientific jargon (the Metaphor). Thus, one essential 
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elem~nt, the 'religious', is lost. This common anthropological 
practice, he argues, stems from a deep negation of any religious or 
metaphysical matter in anthropology, rendering an anthropologist 
a 'blind man speaking about colours'. The missionary, on the other 
~and, has the one major advantage of a true empathy with his 
mformant. 
This thesis needs revision, at least a retouch. Is 'true empathy' 
that productive? As an example we shall look into a discipline that 
explicitly puts this 'eo-believers empathy' at the heart of its 
methodology, the phenomenology of religion. As a major hallmark 
of its heuristics, this tradition within the history of religion 
considers each religion as a phenomenon sui generis (of its own 
kind), abhorring any reduction of religious phenomena into 'lower 
order factors'. Since the epoch-making work of Rudolf Otto Das 
Heilige (1917), the phenomenology of religion has been searching 
for a productive balance between an empiricist approach and a 
method which preserved the true value of religion. In this vein Van 
der Leeuw, Eliade and Widengren wrote their seminal works, to 
mention a few culture-heroes. This tradition always has retained a 
strong link with theology (Sharpe 1975: 234 ff.), even warranting an 
accusation of being a 'handmaiden of theology' (ibid: 264). 
Be it or not, for our argument one thing is clear: a well-devel-
oped discipline explicitly aims at a sympathetic understanding of 
any religion against the background of its own context and history, 
while retaining the full value of the religious phenomena as well as 
respect for the believing othert. 
So much for its program, now for its results. What has been the 
particular productivity of this phenomenological method of epoche, 
the study of religious matters with full suspension of value 
JUdgement? In what measure has it been possible to study religious 
matters without translating them into other values? Two traditions 
can be discerned, which I have dubbed the 'quest for essence' and 
the 'quest for form' (Van Baal & Van Beek 1985: 202, 211). 
Following Otto, theoreticians of religion have searched for 
those elements and aspects of religion deemed essential for a 
generic understanding. Otto's notion of the numinous, Schleier-
ma.c~er's Gefti?l d~s Schlechthinnigen Abhiingichheit, the concept 
of _hte:ophany (E.h~de 1961: 34) and in a way Van Baal's charac-
tenz~tion of a rehg10us attitude as a 'groundseeking groundless-
ness (Van Baal 1972: 61) may serve as examples. These authors 
deepened our understanding of the generic notion of religion; still, 
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in this discussion within phenomenology personal and theological 
arguments had a substantial role. 
From this tradition a severe criticism has been voiced towards 
the general methodological stance of social-scientific study of 
religion: methodological atheism. Rooted in the work of Zijderveldt 
(Towler 1974: 184), this concept has been popularized by Peter 
Berger in his sociology of religion. As the truth or falsehood of 
religion cannot empirically be verified or falsified, Berger argues, 
the correct scientific method, which he prescribes, is to explain the 
religious phenomenon as much as possible through observable 
factors, like social organization, economics, political process; in 
short using non-religious variables. This, of course, is the standard 
anthropological approach of explanation or translation. Witchcraft 
is 'explained' by pointing at tensions within society. Nuer Ewins are 
not truly birds (Evans-Pritchard 1965: 315) but this expression gives 
shape to the special relation of 'normal' Nuer to twins. Against this 
methodological atheism, Eliade argues that the research of religion 
puts itself on a 'naturalistic' point of view, studying any religion as 
an entomologist studies a weird insect: from a great distance 
through an intricate instrument2. Two arguments can be raised 
against this stance. 
Firstly, Eliade argues, that the distance between observer and 
observ .d is false. Only a historical accident (place and date of birth) 
separates scientist and 'object' of study. Secondly, through this 
artificial distance the researcher denies himself a unique oppor-
tunity: as a fellow human the scientist can feel himself in the others 
mocassins, gleaning more insight into his fellow believer. What 
would an entomologist give to be able to 'empathize' with his 
insect! 
Thus far I follow Van der Geest (1987) m his critique on the 
standard anthropological strategy of description and explanation. 
However, a problem arises when we look at the more specific 
results of this sympathetic program, in the second line, the quest for 
form. Granted its own genus, religion appears to the eye of the 
observer in a bewildering variety of forms, a wealth of religious 
expressions that challenges the student. The reaction of the phe-
nomenology of religions is to label and to classify the phenomena: 
the religious experience and expression of one's fellow man are 
continually being processed: labeled with pre-existing descriptive 
concepts, classified m predetermmed categories. Using concepts 
and distinctions from their own religion (the sacred), from classical 
religiOns (numen) or philosophical presuppositions (transcendence), 
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only in a small minority of cases scholars do apply the notions of the 
people studied (taboo, mana, dema); in that later case, anthro-
pologists serve as their major source. In and through the process of 
labeling and categorization, the religious phenomena are changed. 
Even if not reduced to sociology or psychology, they are measured 
on another Procrustean bed, that of comparative analysis. Thus, the 
religious experience and expression is reduced to what phenom-
enology considers to be a phenomenon (Van Baal & Van Beek 1985: 
206). In its own ranks, this tendency of phenomenology has evoked 
the criticism of making only a religious Inventor eines antiquierter 
Meseums3. 
So praxis differs from theory. Despite a heartfelt wish to take 
religious information seriously, in practice the hand of the analyst is 
felt, and heavily. Why this apparent inability to arrive at a 
systematic empathy of informant's expressions? I feel the crux is the 
term 'systematic'. Phenomenology's goal (and Van der Geest's) is 
nothing else but the quest for a truly 'emic' approach: a description 
and sympathetic analysis in terms of that particular system and 
relevant for the participants in that culture or religion, in short 'to 
get inside the informant's head' (Goodenough 1965: 64)4. This call 
for 'true emics' is quite old and will be repeated again in the·future. 
It has its roots in linguistics, in fact in a strictly descriptive 
Bloomfieldian approach. The claim to take religion serious has 
these two sides: the sui generis definition of religion on the one 
hand and the descriptive rigour of an emic approach on the other 
hand. So let us take a quick glance at descriptive emics. 
In anthropology this insistence on emics has nowhere been 
stronger than in ethnoscience. This approach has all the charac-
teristics of a short-lived paradigm: a sudden emergence around a 
few studies, a network of adepts and disciples as well as a quick 
demise of the paradigm'through a fast erosion of its major claims 
(Murray 1982: 168). It is not the place here to delve deeply into the 
reasons for this 'meteoric-disappearance', though some factors 
have to become clear. Firstly, the enormous wealth of detailed 
information gathered in this emic fashion could in no way be 
integrated into a comprehensive description that offered more 
"than could be said on the basis of old-fashioned participant 
observation" (Kay, cited in Murray 1982: 169). The second problem 
was comparison. In some lexical fields this seems to have succeeded 
(Berlin & Kay 1969), but even this much-debated example is an 
excephon. Harris' criticism as to the impossibility of comparison 
(Harris 1988: 315 ff.) has never been answered adequately. Mter all, 
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these types of emic analysis and description may, have been 'Hocus-
Pocus', but surely not 'God's Truth' (Burling 1964: 20). Even worse, 
the strict separation of emics from etics rendered ethnographic 
research 'anemic and emetic' (Berreman 1966: 346), which through 
the demise of Bloomfieldian linguistics accounted for 'paradigms 
lost' (Keesing 1972). Anyway, anthropology's bid for a systematic 
emic approach has withered away: "by the late 1960s ( ... )classical 
ethnoscience was no more" (Murray 1982: 172). A truly emic 
approach showed itself to be impossible and unproductive. 
The failure of ethnoscience and the impotence of phenom-
enology point at a serious flaw with 'true emics'. What makes these 
approaches so sterile? First, the problems of epistemology seem to 
be quite unsurmountable, as the inductive heuristics of the 
approaches stem from a naive empiricism no longer adhered to. 
More important is the aspect of comparison, explicitly aimed at in 
both approaches as their ultimate goal. The necessity for com-
parison does not relate well to an insistence on emics. Even in 
descriptions the use of indigenous terms has to be restricted in order 
to maintain the readability of the description. Comparison, leads to 
a higher level of abstraction and- a greater distance from the 
phenomena: through the analysis of differences and similarities and 
the necessity for a meta-language to express conclusions. Inevi-
tably, this process implies selection, rooted either in a more or less 
explicit theory or in personal interests and preferences. So in 
addition to the informant three other parties are involved: the 
researcher, the scientific community and other religions and 
cultures with which a comparison is made. Both the theoretical 
impossibility of 'true emics' and the comparative nature of 
anthropology (or the study of religion) render explanation or 
metaphorization of religious statement inevitable. These two 
reasons would suffice, if not a third, existential reason presented 
itself: the inherent problem of 'believing anything'. 
The ends of empathy 
As social scientists we share every human trait of the fellow men we 
study, also the capacity of belief. Though for most anthropologists 
their upbringing and training has eroded this faculty, it still is an 
aspect of our existence. Van der Geest (1987) is right in stating that 
this is a research tool as well: an atheistic anthropologist has a 
handicap in religious research. 
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However, this is one side of the coin. True, a researcher who 
does not take religion seriously, bars him- or herself from aspects of 
understanding the believing other. Yet, taking religion seriously is 
not at all the same as taking each and every religious statement 
seriously. One can try to feel empathy with a Kwakiutl who says he 
is a salmon, trying to probe what this means to him or her, without 
ever truly believing the informant is identical to a salmon. After all, 
Sandor did not throw his informant back into the sea either! 
Apparently, our empathy ends somewhere; there is a limit to 
what one can imagine to believe or 'eo-believe'. As an example, a 
famous citation from Foucault (1965) may serve. It is a classification 
of the animal kingdom in the old imperial China: 
The animals are subdivided into 





animals from fables 
running dogs 
mentioned in this classification 
behaving like mad 
innumerable 
drawn with a fine camel's hair 
etcetera 
who come to break the jar 
who from afar look like flies 
Such a classification haunts us, Foucault comments, not because it is 
different and definitely non-occidental, but because we cannot 
imagine ourselves to devise such a 'system'. This impossibilite de 
penser cela is just what I am aiming at. There seems to be a limit to 
our production of empathy and belief, at least in this kind of 
cognitive issues. In my own fieldwork, like many colleagues, I have 
reF:atedly encountered such situations. Some elements of Kapsiki 
behef were easy for me to 'share' with my informants; the cos-
mo.logy, for instance, (Va.n Beek 1978: ~67ff.), I could imagine to 
believe or to be able to beheve. In other sttuations this was quite the 
reverse, like the following, classical therapeutic situation. 
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A blacksmith's woman, specialist in child medicine, treated 
a boy that probably suffered from a parasitic disease: 
swollen abdomen, thin legs and arms. Her diagnosis was 
kwankwerekwe, a small frog that is presumed to enter the 
body through the foot soles, and to proliferate in the belly. 
For treatment the boy knelt before the smith's woman. 
With a handful of leaves she took some muddy water from 
a jar at her feet and rubbed the boy's belly. After some 
rubbing suddenly she put out her hand and showed a small 
frog, presumably coming from the child's belly. She threw 
it in the jar, stroked at it with a stone and resumed the 
treatment. That session she retrieved twenty kwan-
kwerekwe from the boy. 
In this particular case I had spoken with the woman beforehand 
about the treatment. During that first encounter she assumed that I 
did not believe her, or maybe she got some inkling of my unbelief, 
however good I tried to disguise it. After the session with the boy, 
she was sure that I - at last - believed what she had told me would 
happe~. Evidently, I did not correct her, but just as evidently I did 
not believe her. For me it was and is impossible to believe that those 
frogs spring from that belly, a predicament shared, of course, by 
many anthropologists, one that has evoked a number of commen-
taries (Levi-Strauss 1963: 161). Relevant for me in this are two 
considerations. I can not follow the 'official' Kapsiki diagnosis and 
doctrine of treatment, and even more, nor do I see how another 
anthropologist may adhere to the native interpretation. If so, I do 
not ~ee any advantage in doing so for the understanding of that 
particular culture. As a disbeliever in this particular issue, I had to 
account for a difference in knowledge and attitude between patient 
and spectators on the one hand and the smith's woman on the 
other. This classic shamanistic problem has been amply discussed in 
anthropology, but my point here is that the necessity to think the 
matter through beyond the overt informants' statements, adds to 
the understanding of values and processes within that culture. In 
my case, the smith's position gained another dimension, which ap-
peared to be relevant in other aspects of Kapsiki culture too. 
So there is no escape from interpretation and explanation, no 
way of avoiding the Metaphor. Sandor too used an interpretation, 
~ne that- though uncommon- might be closer to Kwakiutl percep-
tion (but maybe not for all Kwakiutl). The opposite question then is: 
What are the limits of empathy for an anthropologist? Each of us 
----------------~--------~--~~~~------------------
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may have his own limits, and for an anthropologist for whom 
religion is not superstition of others those borders may be drawn 
differently than for his atheistic colleagues. Yet, if taken a religious 
position, the anthropologist may provide a better empathy with the 
informants as a eo-believer, it also may be a liability in restricting 
empathy towards specific religious statements. A paradox looms 
here: the anthropologist who takes religions seriously may have a 
differential empathy: some elements of the informant's religion are 
cognitively and emotionally more accessible for him, than in the 
case of an atheistic researcher, as is the general issue of religion, but 
oth.ers. are no~. ~ missionary is faced with a similar problem. As a 
believmg ChrtStian he has a focussed but more restricted empathy 
wi~h specific aspects of the religion in question. He takes religion 
senously but cannot agree with its specific content. The believing 
fellow-man is his partner, but his beliefs are not. 
So given this inevitability of the metaphor and the difference 
between religion and religious content, the question rises whether 
the difference between missionary and anthropologist is in fact as 
large as Van der Geest (1987) asserts. Both distance themselves 
from the factual content of the informants' beliefs, both translate 
them into a language they consider to be a meta-language, an 
encompassing view that can contain the informant's vision but 
definitely is not his. For both some modesty is called for. For a 
missionary it may spring from the realization that the certainties of 
Christianity are subject to erosion (a consideration not relevant for 
fundamentalist missions). The anthropologist is aware of the limi-
tations of his discipline, too. For instance, the level of explanation 
of cultural phenomena is not so high to warrant an overly self-
confident stance. In our discipline explanations seldom surpass the 
level of plausibility, showing how the observed phenomena fit into 
th~ ~rocesses and structu:es of culture, time and place. Especially in 
rehgtous phenomena th1s holds true. No anthropologist can seri-
ously maintain that religious movements have been adequately ex-
plained in all their variety by the standard anthropological theories. 
Consequently, a more moderate and modest methodological 
stan~e would suit anthropology better. Instead of methodological 
athe1sm, I have proposed methodological agnosticism (Van Beek 
1982: 8) as a more honest point of departure. After all, in empirical 
research no anthropologist can make any statement about 'the 
other side of the world'. From an empirical point of view no state-
ment at all can be made, positive nor negative. Of course, even 
when starting from agnosticism, one should look for non-religious 
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factors and processes interacting with the religious phenomena, 
and - inevitably- the Metaphor remains paramount. Still, in such a 
strategy one at least silently acknowledges that not all religious 
phenomena can be totally explained or translated. A starting point 
of 'not-knowing' may render us less pretentious. 
The limits of empathy for both anthropologist and missionary 
and the modesty that would befit both, leads us to the question of 
comrnonalities between both. For this we have to return to the quest 
for emics. Starting with a critique of 'systematic empathy' focusing 
on the cases of phenomenology of religion and ethnoscience, I have 
sketched the ends of empathy. In this, the anthropologist and the 
missionary, though operating from different angles, were shown to 
share some basic similarities, among which the search for under-
standing the other is paramount. If this is so, one major difference 
Van der Geest (1987) perceives between anthropologist and mis-
sionary evaporates, which renders their similarity even stronger. 
So now we have to explore the extent as well as the content of 
these similarities. 
In the following section, I try to outline a common existential 
basis for the similarities between the anthropologist and the 
missionary. Both try to understand the other culture or believer, 
both are limited in this quest for several reasons, and both have to 
rely on interpretation, translation and explanation, on the Meta-
phor. In my view, these commonalities spring from a dominant way 
of life which they both share, the field situation. I think that this 
shared field situation accounts for most of the similarities Van der 
Geest (1987) pointed at. In their quest for emic understanding both 
the anthropologist and the missionary have to select items from the 
culture, assign priorities, translate cultural form and content into 
new forms meaningful for a larger audience. They are able to do so 
as they both are in-between two cultures, the one studied and the 
one of their origin. Being in-between, and being in the field, they 
both create an intermediate culture, a culture of 'understanding', of 
'emics', of 'translation'. It is in this shared in-between culture where 
most similarities between missionary and anthropologist are 
rooted. 
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The anthropologist and the missionary as partners 
in one intermediate culture 
Anthropologists and missionariess share an existential situation 
which I shall call the field situation, which enables them both to 
serve as an independent translator of cultures. 
At the mission post6 as well as in anthropological fieldwork one 
is no longer fully part of one's culture of origin. However, one is 
neither a fully-fledged member of the host culture. This syndrome of 
t~\e 'professional stranger' is well known in anthropology, espe-
Clally in the field. The anthropologist in the field is a stranger to 
both cultures, host and origin. For the missionary the same holds; 
he remains a stranger and grows ever more estranged from his root 
culture through his long field period, even more than the anthro-
pologist. One major aspect of this 'professional stranger' - situation 
is the creation of a pied a terre, one's own domain: the 'post'. 
The missionary is part of a mission culture, either as a 
family at a Protestant mission, or in the Catholic case with 
colleagues. He lives there with a limited and self-selected 
number of people from Western culture, sharing a com-
mon program, living in a surrounding which is neither 
western nor part of local culture, African, Melanesian or 
whatever. The language usually is a European one, 
clothing is Western or professional (= Western), living 
quarters share the best of local culture with Western 
commodities. 
The anthropologist usually creates for himself a com-
parable environment. He or she lives as 'authentically' as 
is feasible, sometimes sharing the compound of a family, 
but often in one's own hut or house. Despite the ideology 
of participation ('living just like .. .') the anthropologist's 
situation does differ significantly from that of his infor-
mants. Finances, health, food and transport are guar-
anteed (including the return ticket). He has the material 
means to render his fieldstay productive, which means 
reasonably comfortable. Both in those instances where the 
researcher has his own household and where he lives in 
with ~noth~r family the anthropologist creates his own 
domatn, pnvate and - if possible - inviolate, his own 
cultural territory. (This may, incidentally, be easier for a 
male anthropologist than for a female colleague). This 
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holds ever stronger in cases of team-research, where non-
anthropologists participate. 
The 'post' is, however, not a Western island in a sea of local culture, 
as the very goal of the post is to be continually open to its host 
culture. But there is an interface between the post and the culture. 
The people on the post interact intensively with a few selected 
members of the local culture (personnel) and less intensively with 
the other people, often on a more focussed basis, consonant with 
the purpose of the work. When venturing out into the host 
community, the selected 'autochtones' serve as guides and go-
betweens. Their networks often serve as channels into this other 
culture. Knowledge of the local language is essential for the 
functioning of the intermediary culture. An interpreter is allowed 
only in the first phase of the fieldstay. Still, even with a reasonable 
mastery of the language, selected locals remain important as a link 
with the outside. 
Mission-posts start working with a self-selected minority 
which remains important in their later phases. These early 
converts, personnel and other followers, can become key 
figures in full grown missions. Striking examples can be 
found in African novels, e.g. Mango Beti's Petit Christ. 
Anthropologists collaborate intensively with a few assis-
tants, however many informants they may list in their 
monograph. As any anthropologist is his own principal 
instrument of research, the number of significant relations 
with the people studied has to remain restricted. Research 
assistants or interpreters belong to the most important 
category of collaborators, often unjustly kept in the 
shadow of the researcher's report, mentioned only in the 
preface of the dissertation. They may harbour their own 
views on the fieldwork done; SaUnas' On the clan of 
anthropologists (Russell 1975: 71-7) is a nice example. My 
own research among the Kapsiki could not have succeeded 
without my assistant, Luc Sunu. He was and still is 
convinced that it was more his research than mine. Maybe 
he is right. 
Compared to the home culture, life at the post is sober, both in 
general comfort, food and clothing. Distraction maybe found in the 
local community, but this is never wholly separated from work. 
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Neither are people from back home helpful in this. They have to be 
entertained and shown around or are a bother in another way. Real 
leisure time is spent with people sharing the same intermediate 
culture, with the partners working in the same field. 
Mission networks are remarkably closed and homo-
geneous, often even restricted to one denomination. 
Representatives from different missions in the same area 
meet seldom, I was astonished to see in Cameroon and 
Mali. In various cases I served as a link between the 
mission. This was especially the case in Cameroon, where 
I had to play the mediator's role between Protestant and 
Catholic missionaries in establishing a standard ortho-
graphy for the Kapsiki language. In any mission the 
difference between a visitor from inside the mission 
network and from one outside is striking. The mission post 
in Kapsiki country had a rest house where missionaries on 
leave or officials stayed. Interaction of local missionaries 
with their colleagues was much easier, more informal and 
more directed at life at the mission than with other 
visitors. The experience was repeated in Mali, for both 
Protestant and Catholic mission posts. 
Also anthropologists take time off, both the possibility to 
do so and its necessity are part of the intermediate culture. 
Contact with colleagues may be difficult to establish, 
though in North Cameroon I had contact with many 
anthropologists. Routinely, however, an anthropologist 
searches for the nearest mission station; or, the quarters of 
a development worker (who also belongs to the in-
between culture) may serve. 
A proclaimed flexibility in food habits and interaction patterns is 
part and parcel of the intermediate culture. Eating and- especially-
~rinking in the larger community is part of the normal routine, 
Important for work. The continuous accessibility for members of the 
host culture is essential for the intermediate one, in fact is viewed as 
an important value. Ideologically, this openness towards the host 
culture forms the distinguishing characteristic between culture of 
origin and the culture in-between. Members of the latter are 
d1fferent from the former, just because they continually relate to 
and are accessible for participants and ideas from the host culture. 
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Some anthropologists may raise doubts whether this holds 
true for the mission. Though for some fundamentalist 
missions it may not hold, in my experience the missionary 
without an open appreciation for his hosts, is an anthro-
pological stereotype. Both in Mali and in Cameroon 
missionizing met with such limited success to necessitate 
an abiding interest in local culture. In mainstream 
missions the old hierarchy between incoming high status 
Europeans and low status locals has long since eroded. 
For the anthropologist this view of himself is customary: 
he is different from other Europeans or Americans by 
having renounced the syndrome of ethnocentricity. This 
very openness towards the other culture, however, is pos-
sible only through the proper intercultural background the 
anthropologist creates for himself. Anyway, his acces-
sibility for and access to the host culture form his principal 
research method. What is viewed as a value, in fact is a 
field tool. 
People change by being part of the intermediary culture. One 
distinguishing trait of both the anthropologist and the missionary is 
t~e problem of readaptation: when coming back from the field stay, 
either at the end of the research period or on furlough, resettling in 
the culture of origin proves difficult. Anthropologists are usually 
proud of this 'secondary culture shock' (Barley 1983), which shows 
them to be true initiates. These readaptation problems spring from 
the gap between host and Western culture. The partners in the 
intermediate culture h<1ve a vested interest in stressing the differ-
ences between these two cultures. After all, they are the translators, 
who render the values of the one culture accessible to the other. The 
values themselves, too, of each particular culture, should not be 
played down either, as the very value of both human culture and 
differences between cultures form the raison d'etre for the existence 
of the intermediate culture. The value of culture is not subject to 
discussion. 
For the missionary this holds too. Though this translation 
proceeds in an opposite direction from the anthro-
pologist's one, it still is a translation. In no way can a 
translated message be parachuted into a local community. 
The hard labours of bible translators, discussions about 
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use of 'local ritual' and musical instruments, as well as the 
implementation of local leadership serve as indications. 
The anthropologist considers translation to be at the 
heart of his profession. Evans Pritchard explicitly states so 
in the introduction to his Nuer Religion7. Often, the 
anthropologist labours under the illusion that the lan-
guage he translates into, is a meta-language. That, of 
course, is only so for a small part; for most purposes it is 
SAE (Standard Average European). 
Commitment to both cultures, host and origin, is essential for the 
intermediate one, being in fact a bridge between the two. The 
culture in-between is not an overlap between host and own, but a 
gate. The partners in the intermediate culture select which elements 
from one culture will be translated into the other. Value judgements 
of both other cultures as well as assessments of relative weight are 
done by the gatekeepers, the in-between partners. This selection of 
cultural elements is a fundamental difference between the partners 
in the intermediary one and participants in any one culture: the 
former are the only ones able to form a balanced opinion about the 
intrinsic values of both cultures. 
Against the people back-home this shows as a relativism, 
and against the local culture as a severe criticism of the 
home culture. Though tensions between homefront and 
mission are not evident, they do exist nevertheless. 
Especially for fundamentalist missions (well represented 
i~ Africa) the image of the mission field is strikingly 
d1fferent from that held by the missionaries. In the case of 
the mainstream missions a longer missionary tradition 
and a less direct link with the background church have led 
to more an autonomous mission field. Still, values and 
norms developed in the field diverge from the church back 
home. As an example the relative tolerance of polygyny in 
the catholic mission in Mali may serve; there the 
missionaries follow a strategy of not wanting to know, in 
order not to have to condemn. 
For an anthropologist back-home is more diverse. 
The academic community serving as a background does 
not normally belong to the intermediate culture. Touring 
the field, colleagues (and superVlsors of theses) can be a 
pain in the neck. Family and friends rarely visit the more 
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remote field areas and are of little influence. Other 
visitors may be chance ones, like tourists; in both of my 
research areas they represented the home culture most 
emphatically, sometimes amusing, sometimes exasper-
ating, usually bothering and always time consuming. This 
diversity of background makes critique of the home culture 
easy for the anthropologist, while at the same time 
rendering it relatively harmless and ineffective. 
The position as gatekeepers, which the partners in the intermediate 
culture share, is bolstered by the respect they enjoy from both 
cultures in question. For the local hosts they represent the dominant 
Western culture, even deemed superior by many. In short, the 
partners are viewed as people who were kind enough to step down. 
The people 'back-home' view the soberness and accessibility of the 
in-betweens as a (relative) sacrifice the partners bring in order to 
stay in the host culture, and as such as a proof of commitment to a 
noble cause or of a laudable academic dedication. The existential 
privileges of living in that intermediate culture are evident only to 
its participants (and let us leave it that way). 
A mild culture relativism is, as we said, essential for the 
intermediate culture, as the partners live under a constant pression 
for self-justification. Their presence in the field may be appreciated 
by both cultures, but is self-evident to none. Besides, the grounds for 
appreciation by the other cultures, differ sharply from the reasons 
why anthropologists and missionary stay in the field. 
The basis for justification of the mission is changing, at 
least in Africa. The people back home still adhere to the 
stereotyped vision that the diffusion and permanence of 
Christianity is at stake in the presence of the missionary. 
Developments in African Christianity have long since 
caught up with this view. In West-African missions, for 
instance, the tasks and roles of the expatriates are being 
redefined, a process much longer under way in other parts 
of Africa. lndigenization of African churches implies a 
marginalization of missionary. On the one hand they are 
being retrained - or redefined - as development workers, a 
role they fulfill with varying success and fluctuating 
motivation. On the other hand they are diriges a l'ethno-
graphie, as a missionary recently told me in North 
Cameroon. Especially for the more fundamentalist mis-
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sions this change is hard to stomach. According to one 
missionary of the Lutheran Brethren Mission in 
Cameroon, his new role as a development worker implied 
that he had to make people rich, thereby turning them 
away from the church. One missionary's son had, as a 
consequence, left the missionary service and started an 
automobile workshop in Cameroon in order to be more 
influential in the local church. 
An anthropologist's self-justification is usually less 
complex, as his stay is both marginal and short. For the 
local people, the anthropologist's fieldstay is usually less 
problematic than for the researcher himself; they almost 
routinely use the anthropologist as a pawn in local power 
arenas. My own justification in Cameroon was to write a 
local history, an explanation needed as the chef de canton 
had some suspicions how the other Kapsiki would use my 
presence. In Dogon country, by contrast, I felt no need to 
explain my stay in the field. Whereas other villages had 
long since been 'honoured' with anthropologists, time was 
more than ripe that this particular village had its share. 
Most of the need for justification springs from the 
anthropologist himself. Various reasons, like the imbal-
ance between giving to and receiving from the host culture 
and the fundamental debt the anthropologist feels 
towards his host culture, account for that; for the host 
culture it easily results in becoming a partisan for, of 
course still from the relative comforts of the intermediate 
culture. A positive evaluation of concepts like 'cultural 
diversity', 'tradition', 'equality' and 'group identity' form a 
part of this attitude. 
These latter values, belonging to a small-scale society giving we-
feeling to a marginal group, are highly relevant in the ideology of 
the intermediate culture. As a systematic ideology cultural 
relativism is in itself void, and should be filled in with inherent 
values of specific interpersonal relations. The missionary usually 
shares these values and aims at preserving them in the 
implementation of the mission program. In both instances, for the 
anthropologist as well as the missionary, these values fit in a social 
environment small enough to control through a personal network: 
they define a manageable group and a flock that can be herded. Of 
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course, these values restrict cultural relativism. The missionary has 
to translate an external message into the local culture and yet 
preserve the values he cherishes in it, and, integrate those elements 
he deems of worth. The anthropologist on the one hand has to deny 
the perceived superiority of his home culture, while on the other 
hand affirming or even restoring the value of the local culture. The 
same cultural relativism that makes him criticize his culture of 
origin - at least its pretensions and the way the local culture 
perceives it - challenges him into an over-valuation of the other 
culture. 
A missionary in such a case may turn partisan, though in 
my experience it happens less often than van der Geest 
(1987) seems to suggest. Most missionaries I have 
encountered have a great respect for individual members 
of the host culture, but have little inclination to play the 
partisan. Not all political situations give rise to that 
necessity. Yet, missionaries usually define relationships 
more on a one to one basis. 
The anthropologist probably tends more to extend 
and abstract his appreciation of persons towards a society 
and a culture. After all, very few field anthropologists 
actually dislike 'their' people; most of us combine a close, 
intimate relation with individual people with a positive 
valuation of their culture. I remember my own irritations 
over the self-denigrating way the Kapsiki of Cameroon 
spoke about their own cultures. If my presence and 
research would heighten their self-esteem and ethnic we-
feeling, I would feel rewarded. When presently this indeed 
happens (van Beek 1988), I experience it as some justi-
fication of my work, anyway as a positive change. The 
only deception, evidently, is the minute part I really played 
in it. 
Yet, cultural relativism remains an empty message, with an 
inherent contradiction: any systematic relativism destroys both 
one's own theoretical position and the appreciation of the culture 
studied. The only way out is a restricted relativism, through the 
process of selection of cultural elements that is central to the 
intermediate culture. It is the relative autonomy of that culture in-
between that enables anthropologist and missionary to play the 
gate-keeper's role, albeit to a limited extent. Relativism is always 
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basically a moral judgement. The contradictions between cultural 
selection and denial of judgement can only be met in appropriating 
the rules of evaluation. This precisely is the luxury of the field 
culture, and sets off anthropologist and missionary alike as part-
ners in one, intermediate, culture. 
Notes 
1 That a strict reliance on written sources, bears another, inevitable bias is 
a typical anthropological critique, which is not relevant for our discus-
sion here. 
2 The need for 'explanation' is of course a hidden way to face the question 
of truth: the Kwakiutl stating himself to be a salmon, cannot be believed 
at face value. According to Fabian, this problem of dealing with veracity 
shows the remnants of "a positivist philosophy of science which has run 
its course" (Fabian 1979, 1981). Still, it is difficult to see how, under 
whatever epistemology, this kind of question can wholly be abolished. 
3 Van der Leeuw too, recognizes this problem: "I realized that this 
phenomenology of religion could not only consist of an inventory and 
classification of phenomena ... " (cited in Sharpe 1975: 231). His solution is 
one of self-analysis and introspection by the researcher, a venue that 
most anthropologists would not opt for. 
4 Another view on em1c is more formal, defining it through diacritical 
rules that are relevant only withm the system. Beyond linguistics, 
though, the difference is less marked ' 
5. For convenience I use both terms masculine; evidently, both the female 
~nd the male_ r~presentatives of the species are meant, especially for the 
a~th_ropologtst. T_hroughout, I refer to Western anthropologists and 
mtsswnanes. Thetr non-western colleagues, despite their different 
culture of origin, have to be counted too as partners in the intermediate 
culture, through their education, posttion and international contact. 
Still, most of them tend to lessen the gap between the host and own 
culture, by working in their own culture of origin. 
6 With 'missionary' both the Catholic and Protestant variety is meant, as 
with the term 'mission'. 
7. The call for 'truly emic' description originated in the realization that 
traduttore equals tradittore. Hence emic approaches avoid translation 
labeling as long as possible, which often renders publications of 
ethnoscience very hard to read. 
8. Research on the Kapsiki of Cameroon has been done in 1971, 1972-3, 
1979, 1988 and made possible by grants of WOTRO (Foundation for the 
advancement of tropical research) and the University of Utrecht. 
Research m Malt on the Dogon has been going on since 1978, financed by 
the same sources 
The Culture 'in-between' 119 
References 
Berreman, G.D. 
1966 Anemic and Emetic Analyses in Social Anthropology. American 
Anthropologist, 68: pp. 346-54. 
Burling, R. 
1964 Cognition and Componential Analysis: Gods Truth or Hocus 




Images and Symbols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
The quest: History and Meaning in Religion. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Evans-Pritchard, E.E. 




The Anthropology of Religious Movements: from Explanation 
to Interpretation. Social Research, 46(1): pp. 4-35. 
Six Theses Regarding the Anthropology of African Religious 
Movements. Religion, 11: pp. 109-26. 
Goodenough, W.H. 
1965 Description and Comparzson. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
Foucault, M. 
1965 Les mats et les chases. Parijs: Pion. 
Harris, M. 
1968 The Rise of Anthropologzcal Theory. New York: Crowell. 
Keesing. R.M. 
1972 Paradigms Lost Componential Analysis after the Bloomfieldian 
Linguistics. Ethnology· pp 134-61. 
Levi-Strauss, Cl. 
1963 Le sorcier et sa magie. Anthropolog1e structurale: pp. 161-83. 
Murray, S.O. 
1982 The Dissolution of 'Classical Ethnoscience'. Journal of the 
History of the Behavwral Sciences, 18: pp. 163-75. 
Otto, R. 
1917 Das Helllge. Uber das Irratwna/e m der Idee des Gottlzchen und 
sem Verhaltms zum Ratwnalen Breslau: Trwendt & Grabier. 
120 The Ambiguity of Rapprochement 
Russell, H.B. 
1975 The Human Way. Readings in Anthropology. New York: 
MacMillan. 
Sharpe, E.J. 
1975 Comparative Religion: a History. Londen: Duckworth. 
Towler, R. 
1974 
Van Baal, J. 
Homo Religiosus. Sociological Problems in the Study of 
Religion. Londen: Constable. 
1967 Mensen in verandering. Ontstaan en groei van een nieuwe 
cultuur in ontwikkelingslanden. Amsterdam. 
1972 De boodschap der drie illusies. Assen: van Gorcum. 
Van Baal, J. & W.E.A. van Beek 
1985 Symbols for Communication. An Introduction to the 
Anthropological Study of Religion. Assen: van Gorcum. 
Van Beek, W.E.A. 
1982 Spiegel van de mens. Religie en antropologie. Assen: van 
Gorcum. 
1988 The Flexibility of Domest1c Production: the Kapsiki and their 
Transformations. Paper voor congres Political Economy of 
Cameroon, a historical perspective, 1-4 juni 1988, Leiden. 
Van der Geest, Sj. 
1987 Antropologen en missionarissen: verborgen gelijkenissen. 
Antropologische Verkenningen, 6(4): pp. 1-18. 
Van der Leeuw, G. 
n.d. Phiinomenologie der Religion. Ti.ibingen: Mohr. 
